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1 simple
simple [sɛ̃pl]1. adjectivea. simple ; [nœud, cornet de glace] single• pour faire simple... (faire les choses simplement) to make things simple... ; (dire les choses simplement) to put it simply...b. ( = modeste) [personne] unpretentiousc. ( = de condition modeste) ce sont des gens simples they are simple folkd. ( = naïf) simplee. ( = ordinaire) [particulier, salarié] ordinary• vous obtiendrez le cadeau sur simple envoi de ce bon for your free gift, simply send us this voucher• vous obtiendrez des informations sur simple appel simply pick up the phone and you will get all the information you need2. masculine noun• les prix peuvent varier du simple au double prices can vary by as much as 100%• simple messieurs/dames men's/women's singles* * *sɛ̃pl
1.
1) ( facile)c'est (bien) simple, il ne fait plus rien — he simply doesn't do anything any more
2) ( sans prétention) [repas, cérémonie, mariage, vie, goûts] simple; [décoration, intérieur] plain; [vêtement] simple, plain; [personne, air] unaffected, unpretentious3) ( modeste) [origines] modest4) ( ordinaire) [fonctionnaire, travailleur] ordinarymême en hiver, il n'est vêtu que d'une simple chemise — even in winter he only ou just wears a shirt
ce ne sera qu'une simple formalité/vérification — it will be a mere formality/a simple check
réduire quelque chose à sa plus simple expression — to reduce something to a minimum, to pare something down to basics
5) ( peu intelligent) [personne] simple6) Chimie, Botanique simple7) Linguistique [passé, futur] simple8) ( non multiple) [cornet de glace, nœud] single
2.
nom masculin1) ( dans un calcul)2) Sportsimple dames/messieurs — ladies'/men's singles (pl)
* * *sɛ̃pl1. adj1) (pas compliqué) (personne, méthode, chose) simple2) (non multiple) single3) (avant le nom) (= ordinaire)2. nm1) TENNIS (= match)2)3. simples nmplMÉDECINE medicinal plants* * *A adj1 ( facile) [problème, question, situation, idée] simple, straightforward; [choix, moyen, façon, explication, calcul] simple; son raisonnement est très simple his/her reasoning is very simple; je veux des phrases simples mais correctes I want simple but correct sentences; la situation est loin d'être simple the situation is far from (being) simple ou straightforward; c'est (bien) simple, il ne fait plus rien he simply doesn't do anything any more; pourquoi faire simple quand on peut faire compliqué? iron why not make life even more difficult for yourself?;2 ( sans prétention) [repas, cérémonie, mariage, vie, goûts] simple; [décoration, intérieur] plain; [vêtement] simple, plain; [personne, air] unaffected, unpretentious; elle portait une jupe toute simple she was wearing a very simple ou plain skirt; elle est simple et naturelle she's unaffected and natural; il est resté très simple malgré son succès he's remained very unpretentious in spite of his success;4 ( ordinaire) [avertissement, remarque] mere; [fonctionnaire, travailleur] ordinary; c'est une simple question d'honneur/de bon sens it's simply ou purely a question of honourGB/of common sense; un simple tour de clé suffit just one turn of the key does it; il est simple garçon de café/employé du bureau he's just a waiter in a café/a clerk; il l'a mis KO d'un simple coup de poing he knocked him out with a single blow; même en hiver, il n'est vêtu que d'une simple chemise even in winter he only ou just wears a shirt; pour la simple raison que for the simple reason that; le simple fait de poser la question the mere fact of asking the question; par simple curiosité out of pure curiosity; sur simple présentation du passeport simply on presentation of one's passport; ce ne sera qu'une simple formalité/vérification it will be a mere formality/a simple check; réduire qch à sa plus simple expression to reduce sth to a minimum;5 ( peu intelligent) [personne] simple; il est gentil mais un peu simple he's nice but a bit simple;7 Ling [passé, futur] simple;8 ( non multiple) [cornet de glace, nœud] single.B nm1 ( dans un calcul) le prix varie du simple au double the price can turn out to be twice as high;simple d'esprit simple-minded; c'est un or il est simple d'esprit he's simple-minded; simple soldat private.[sɛ̃pl] adjectifc'est très simple à utiliser it's very easy ou simple to usec'est une simple question d'argent it's simply ou only a matter of moneypour la simple raison que... for the simple reason that...vous aurez une démonstration gratuite sur simple appel all you need do is (to) ou simply phone this number for a free demonstrationce n'est qu'une simple formalité it's merely a ou it's a mere formality————————[sɛ̃pl] nom masculin1. [ce qui est facile]2. [proportion]simple messieurs/dames men's/ladies' singles————————simples nom masculin plurielmedicinal herbs ou plantssimple d'esprit nom masculinsimple d'esprit locution adjectivale -
2 semplice
simple( non doppio) single( spontaneo) natural* * *semplice agg.1 ( di un solo elemento) simple; single: filo semplice, single thread; nodo semplice, single knot; (gramm.) tempo semplice, simple tense // corsa semplice, one-way ride // (dir.): bancarotta semplice, bankruptcy; furto semplice, simple theft // (amm.): partita semplice, single entry; certificato in carta semplice, certificate on unstamped paper // (fin.): capitalizzazione semplice, simple-interest accounting; interessi semplici, simple interest // (mat.): equazione, frazione semplice, simple equation, fraction; regola del tre semplice, rule of three; punto semplice, simple point // (stat.) media semplice, simple mean // (eccl.) voti semplici, simple vows2 ( solo) simple; mere; sheer: la semplice descrizione dei fatti, the mere description of the facts; fu condannato in base a un semplice sospetto, he was condemned on a mere suspicion; l'ho visto per la semplice ragione che passava, I saw him for the simple reason that he was passing by; è follia pura e semplice, it is sheer (o stark) madness; è un ladro puro e semplice, he is an out and out thief; è una truffa pura e semplice, this is cheating pure and simple; la verità pura e semplice, the plain truth (o the truth pure and simple)3 ( non ricercato) simple, plain; ( senza malizia) simple-hearted: un'anima semplice, a simple soul; cibo, mobilia semplice, plain food, furniture; gente semplice, plain (o homely) people; parole semplici, plain words; un uomo semplice, a plain man; vestito semplice, plain (o simple) dress; la vita semplice, the simple life; è una ragazza semplice, she is a simple girl; avere gusti semplici, to have simple tastes4 ( facile) simple, easy: una domanda semplice, an easy question; metodo semplice, simple (o easy) method; il mio compito è piuttosto semplice, my task is quite easy5 ( di grado più basso) ordinary, common: operaio semplice, unskilled worker; marinaio semplice, ordinary seaman; i semplici iscritti, rank-and-file members.* * *['semplitʃe]1) [ filo] single; [nodo, frattura] simple2) (facile) [problema, domanda, compito] simple, easy; [situazione, idea, soluzione, modo, spiegazione] simple, straightforward3) (essenziale) [pasto, cerimonia, vita, gusti] simple; [abbigliamento, decorazione, arredamento] simple, plain4) (alla buona) [persona, gente] simple5) (solo)è una semplice formalità — it's a mere formality, just a formality
6) mil.7) chim. bot. simple8) ling. simple* * *semplice/'semplit∫e/1 [ filo] single; [nodo, frattura] simple2 (facile) [problema, domanda, compito] simple, easy; [situazione, idea, soluzione, modo, spiegazione] simple, straightforward; il suo ragionamento è molto semplice his reasoning is very simple3 (essenziale) [pasto, cerimonia, vita, gusti] simple; [abbigliamento, decorazione, arredamento] simple, plain4 (alla buona) [persona, gente] simple5 (solo) per il semplice motivo che for the simple reason that; è una semplice formalità it's a mere formality, just a formality; è un semplice impiegato he's just a clerk6 mil. soldato semplice private (soldier)7 chim. bot. simple8 ling. simple. -
3 il suo ragionamento è molto semplice
Dizionario Italiano-Inglese > il suo ragionamento è molto semplice
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4 Thinking
But what then am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels. (Descartes, 1951, p. 153)I have been trying in all this to remove the temptation to think that there "must be" a mental process of thinking, hoping, wishing, believing, etc., independent of the process of expressing a thought, a hope, a wish, etc.... If we scrutinize the usages which we make of "thinking," "meaning," "wishing," etc., going through this process rids us of the temptation to look for a peculiar act of thinking, independent of the act of expressing our thoughts, and stowed away in some particular medium. (Wittgenstein, 1958, pp. 41-43)Analyse the proofs employed by the subject. If they do not go beyond observation of empirical correspondences, they can be fully explained in terms of concrete operations, and nothing would warrant our assuming that more complex thought mechanisms are operating. If, on the other hand, the subject interprets a given correspondence as the result of any one of several possible combinations, and this leads him to verify his hypotheses by observing their consequences, we know that propositional operations are involved. (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, p. 279)In every age, philosophical thinking exploits some dominant concepts and makes its greatest headway in solving problems conceived in terms of them. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers construed knowledge, knower, and known in terms of sense data and their association. Descartes' self-examination gave classical psychology the mind and its contents as a starting point. Locke set up sensory immediacy as the new criterion of the real... Hobbes provided the genetic method of building up complex ideas from simple ones... and, in another quarter, still true to the Hobbesian method, Pavlov built intellect out of conditioned reflexes and Loeb built life out of tropisms. (S. Langer, 1962, p. 54)Experiments on deductive reasoning show that subjects are influenced sufficiently by their experience for their reasoning to differ from that described by a purely deductive system, whilst experiments on inductive reasoning lead to the view that an understanding of the strategies used by adult subjects in attaining concepts involves reference to higher-order concepts of a logical and deductive nature. (Bolton, 1972, p. 154)There are now machines in the world that think, that learn and create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to increase rapidly until-in the visible future-the range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the range to which the human mind has been applied. (Newell & Simon, quoted in Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 138)But how does it happen that thinking is sometimes accompanied by action and sometimes not, sometimes by motion, and sometimes not? It looks as if almost the same thing happens as in the case of reasoning and making inferences about unchanging objects. But in that case the end is a speculative proposition... whereas here the conclusion which results from the two premises is an action.... I need covering; a cloak is a covering. I need a cloak. What I need, I have to make; I need a cloak. I have to make a cloak. And the conclusion, the "I have to make a cloak," is an action. (Nussbaum, 1978, p. 40)It is well to remember that when philosophy emerged in Greece in the sixth century, B.C., it did not burst suddenly out of the Mediterranean blue. The development of societies of reasoning creatures-what we call civilization-had been a process to be measured not in thousands but in millions of years. Human beings became civilized as they became reasonable, and for an animal to begin to reason and to learn how to improve its reasoning is a long, slow process. So thinking had been going on for ages before Greece-slowly improving itself, uncovering the pitfalls to be avoided by forethought, endeavoring to weigh alternative sets of consequences intellectually. What happened in the sixth century, B.C., is that thinking turned round on itself; people began to think about thinking, and the momentous event, the culmination of the long process to that point, was in fact the birth of philosophy. (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan, 1980, p. xi)The way to look at thought is not to assume that there is a parallel thread of correlated affects or internal experiences that go with it in some regular way. It's not of course that people don't have internal experiences, of course they do; but that when you ask what is the state of mind of someone, say while he or she is performing a ritual, it's hard to believe that such experiences are the same for all people involved.... The thinking, and indeed the feeling in an odd sort of way, is really going on in public. They are really saying what they're saying, doing what they're doing, meaning what they're meaning. Thought is, in great part anyway, a public activity. (Geertz, quoted in J. Miller, 1983, pp. 202-203)Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. (Einstein, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 17)What, in effect, are the conditions for the construction of formal thought? The child must not only apply operations to objects-in other words, mentally execute possible actions on them-he must also "reflect" those operations in the absence of the objects which are replaced by pure propositions. Thus, "reflection" is thought raised to the second power. Concrete thinking is the representation of a possible action, and formal thinking is the representation of a representation of possible action.... It is not surprising, therefore, that the system of concrete operations must be completed during the last years of childhood before it can be "reflected" by formal operations. In terms of their function, formal operations do not differ from concrete operations except that they are applied to hypotheses or propositions [whose logic is] an abstract translation of the system of "inference" that governs concrete operations. (Piaget, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 237)[E]ven a human being today (hence, a fortiori, a remote ancestor of contemporary human beings) cannot easily or ordinarily maintain uninterrupted attention on a single problem for more than a few tens of seconds. Yet we work on problems that require vastly more time. The way we do that (as we can observe by watching ourselves) requires periods of mulling to be followed by periods of recapitulation, describing to ourselves what seems to have gone on during the mulling, leading to whatever intermediate results we have reached. This has an obvious function: namely, by rehearsing these interim results... we commit them to memory, for the immediate contents of the stream of consciousness are very quickly lost unless rehearsed.... Given language, we can describe to ourselves what seemed to occur during the mulling that led to a judgment, produce a rehearsable version of the reaching-a-judgment process, and commit that to long-term memory by in fact rehearsing it. (Margolis, 1987, p. 60)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Thinking
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5 Knowledge
It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it into question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? (Berkeley, 1996, Pt. I, No. 4, p. 25)It seems to me that the only objects of the abstract sciences or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances.But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that where there is no property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration. (Hume, 1975, Sec. 12, Pt. 3, pp. 163-165)Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (the ability to receive impressions), the second is the power to know an object through these representations (spontaneity in the production of concepts).Through the first, an object is given to us; through the second, the object is thought in relation to that representation.... Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or empirical.... Pure intuitions or pure concepts are possible only a priori; empirical intuitions and empirical concepts only a posteriori. If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any way affected, is to be called "sensibility," then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called "understanding." Our nature is so constituted that our intuitions can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding.... Without sensibility, no object would be given to us; without understanding, no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise. (Kant, 1933, Sec. 1, Pt. 2, B74-75 [p. 92])Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of Reason is real, but it is also, in itself, dialectical and deceptive.... Hence to attempt to draw our principles from it, and in their employment to follow this natural but none the less fallacious illusion can never produce science, but only an empty dialectical art, in which one school may indeed outdo the other, but none can ever attain a justifiable and lasting success. In order that, as a science, it may lay claim not merely to deceptive persuasion, but to insight and conviction, a Critique of Reason must exhibit in a complete system the whole stock of conceptions a priori, arranged according to their different sources-the Sensibility, the understanding, and the Reason; it must present a complete table of these conceptions, together with their analysis and all that can be deduced from them, but more especially the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori by means of their deduction, the principles of its use, and finally, its boundaries....This much is certain: he who has once tried criticism will be sickened for ever of all the dogmatic trash he was compelled to content himself with before, because his Reason, requiring something, could find nothing better for its occupation. Criticism stands to the ordinary school metaphysics exactly in the same relation as chemistry to alchemy, or as astron omy to fortune-telling astrology. I guarantee that no one who has comprehended and thought out the conclusions of criticism, even in these Prolegomena, will ever return to the old sophistical pseudo-science. He will rather look forward with a kind of pleasure to a metaphysics, certainly now within his power, which requires no more preparatory discoveries, and which alone can procure for reason permanent satisfaction. (Kant, 1891, pp. 115-116)Knowledge is only real and can only be set forth fully in the form of science, in the form of system. Further, a so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, even if it is true, it is yet none the less false, just because and in so far as it is merely a fundamental proposition, merely a first principle. It is for that reason easily refuted. The refutation consists in bringing out its defective character; and it is defective because it is merely the universal, merely a principle, the beginning. If the refutation is complete and thorough, it is derived and developed from the nature of the principle itself, and not accomplished by bringing in from elsewhere other counter-assurances and chance fancies. It would be strictly the development of the principle, and thus the completion of its deficiency, were it not that it misunderstands its own purport by taking account solely of the negative aspect of what it seeks to do, and is not conscious of the positive character of its process and result. The really positive working out of the beginning is at the same time just as much the very reverse: it is a negative attitude towards the principle we start from. Negative, that is to say, in its one-sided form, which consists in being primarily immediate, a mere purpose. It may therefore be regarded as a refutation of what constitutes the basis of the system; but more correctly it should be looked at as a demonstration that the basis or principle of the system is in point of fact merely its beginning. (Hegel, 1910, pp. 21-22)Knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially connected. The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action: knowing is for the sake of doing. And action, obviously, is rooted in evaluation. For a being which did not assign comparative values, deliberate action would be pointless; and for one which did not know, it would be impossible. Conversely, only an active being could have knowledge, and only such a being could assign values to anything beyond his own feelings. A creature which did not enter into the process of reality to alter in some part the future content of it, could apprehend a world only in the sense of intuitive or esthetic contemplation; and such contemplation would not possess the significance of knowledge but only that of enjoying and suffering. (Lewis, 1946, p. 1)"Evolutionary epistemology" is a branch of scholarship that applies the evolutionary perspective to an understanding of how knowledge develops. Knowledge always involves getting information. The most primitive way of acquiring it is through the sense of touch: amoebas and other simple organisms know what happens around them only if they can feel it with their "skins." The knowledge such an organism can have is strictly about what is in its immediate vicinity. After a huge jump in evolution, organisms learned to find out what was going on at a distance from them, without having to actually feel the environment. This jump involved the development of sense organs for processing information that was farther away. For a long time, the most important sources of knowledge were the nose, the eyes, and the ears. The next big advance occurred when organisms developed memory. Now information no longer needed to be present at all, and the animal could recall events and outcomes that happened in the past. Each one of these steps in the evolution of knowledge added important survival advantages to the species that was equipped to use it.Then, with the appearance in evolution of humans, an entirely new way of acquiring information developed. Up to this point, the processing of information was entirely intrasomatic.... But when speech appeared (and even more powerfully with the invention of writing), information processing became extrasomatic. After that point knowledge did not have to be stored in the genes, or in the memory traces of the brain; it could be passed on from one person to another through words, or it could be written down and stored on a permanent substance like stone, paper, or silicon chips-in any case, outside the fragile and impermanent nervous system. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, pp. 56-57)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Knowledge
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